After the Darusman Report came out, with its excessive attack on the manner in which Sri Lanka had dealt with LTTE terrorism, I thought it necessary to warn the . Sri Lankas Failure To Respond Darusman Report Did the Panel consult the heads of UN agencies in Sri Lanka with regard to the various. 25 May , Colombo, Sri Lanka: The Centre for Policy content in the LLRC’s final report more widely known and accessible, and thereby.
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September 26, in March of Folly Tags: I referred last week to the manner in which Chandrika and her cohorts were promoting Reconciliation. In the nineties she and Mangala had embarked on the Sudu Nelum movement, which did not win hearts and minds but at least that functioned in areas which were supposed to have a majority mindset that was to be changed.
In time however the idea of Reconciliation through cultural activity became the preserve of the elite. As I noted when I took over the Peace Secretariat, vast amounts of money were given to those with good connections to produce propaganda supposed to promote peace.
I used to call this the Dancing Butterflies syndrome, different coloured youngsters moving together so as, iin theory at any rate, to encourage ethnic binding.
No one bothered to measure the impact of all this work, or rather of all this money for very little work. The technique employed was, it seems, to interview older people and create monologues from their memoirs. I daruskan invited to a performance of four monologues, and am very glad I went, since a couple were most entertaining. The most entertaining told us little about reoort past though, one being a wryly amusing account of an old lady darusmn to cope with the modern technology through which her children, now living abroad, try to maintain contact.
Pia Hatch, daughter of two memorable stage stars of the seventies, Graham and Michelle Leembruggen, was delightful as an old lady not sure what buttons to push or how to deal with a Skype call. The second lively performance was in fact a dialogue, between a lady who had been great friends with those who plotted the coup and her devoted manservant.
His asides were most amusing, while Ranmali Mirchandani captured daarusman the cocooned siinhala of ladies of leisure in those distant days. I suspect nothing much has changed, except that they now have to jostle with those whose wealth is more darusnan to exercise influence with decision makers.
November 6, in International Relations and Security Tags: The Paranagama and the Geneva Reports: The Government has alleged that the Paranagama Report agrees with the Channel 4 video allegations.
It is a deliberate misreading of the Paranagama Report. If, of course, the authenticity of the video is proved, that would establish a prima facia case.
The Paranagama Commission goes on to advocate that there should be a proper judicial inquiry. Indeed the very same was suggested by the LLRC report, which called for an independent investigation. Thus to say that the Paranagama Commission has validated the genuineness of the Channel 4 footage is false. Because if it had, what would be the necessity to call for an inquiry to ascertain the authenticity of the footage?
Indeed the Paranagama Commission criticizes Channel 4 in paragraph page for failing to supply the original film footage. Why would the Paranagama Commission do this, if it had accepted the film footage as authentic? The answer to this question is to be found in paragraph 22 page 8 of the OISL report which reads as follows: Thus, it is quite clear, that the OISL report is firmly grounded in the grave allegations made by the Darusman Report.
Therefore it raises the question as to why the Paranagama Commission 2 nd Mandate Report which dealt with most of the allegations in the Darusman Report was not tabled in Geneva by the Government. November 5, in International Relations and Security Tags: I have refrained thus far from getting involved in the debate over the Geneva Resolution for a number of reasons.
One is a commitment to finalize a few books, and in particular an account of what Sri Lanka did right, in winning the war, and then did wrong in losing the peace. Secondly, I had long felt that the last government was destroying the country by its ostrich approach to the allegations made against us.
Darusman, LLRC and Petrie conundrum
As I told Al Jazeera on the day I expressed publicly my support for the Maithripala Sirisena candidacy, when hardly any one else who was part of the previous government took the plunge, I reoprt that a continuation of the Rajapaksa Presidency would lead to disaster. I was glad someone who had stood foursquare behind the President during the war years was the challenger, because while I hoped he would correct the faults that had arisen after the war, I assumed he would stand by the achievement of the first Repoet Presidency in eradicating terrorism from Sri Lanka.
I was deeply disappointed that the new government did not embark on the reforms it had promised, and also disappointed that it did not move swiftly towards transparency on the question of accountability.
I proposed at my first Parliamentary Group meeting that we should publish the Udalagama Commission Report, because I believed its findings would make clear that our judiciary was perfectly capable of conducting a credible inquiry.
I had also long argued that justice needed to be done for the boys killed in Trincomalee, and had repeated urged the President to ensure that indictments were made. The Prime Minister said he would look into ln matter, but it was not even minuted — as opposed to mechanisms to find vehicles and provide jobs for supporters — and after I left the group it was forgotten.
The same seems to have happened to the Paranagama Report, to which, belatedly, the Rajapaksa government had added value through the advice of international lawyers who were aware, unlike the Foreign Ministry, of the danger of the charges made against us.
Just as, alone of Parliamentarians, I had two years ago signed a petition about the killings at Weliveriya, I signed this year a petition asking the President to ensure that justice was done to our forces by publicizing the Report.
While I had no doubt that, like the LLRC, it would demand accountability with regard to events as to which there was prima facie evidence of abuse, it would make it clear that the worst charges against us were incorrect.
Sadly my detailed defence of the errors in the Darusman Report was completely ignored by decision makers in the last government, except for the one person who understood the importance of our image. When nothing was done and we subscribed to a resolution that detracts from the very principles on which the UN had been established, I feared that the same lack of intelligence was now affecting our decision makers and those advising them.
The consequences to the country will be equally disastrous. However what seems to be subterfuge in Parliament makes me wonder whether I am wrong to assume just incompetence, and whether I should worry sinhalz an agenda that will daruwman this country of all self respect.
After all, eight years ago, I recall those now in authority trying to stop our defeat of terrorism by invoking foreign assistance. I have therefore engaged in some study of the issues repoft experts on the subject, and would like to bring the following facts into the public domain, through a simple question and answer exercise —.
Darusman report on sri lanka pdf | dntklm
Do you accept the statements made ainhala the Government in relation to the 1 st and 2 nd mandate reports issued by the Presidential Commission sinhla Investigate Missing Persons, otherwise known as the Paranagama Commission? No, because the statements made are misleading, and in large measure lacking in truth. They strike at the very heart of good governance, especially when Parliament and the country as a whole are seeking to discover the truth.
The Government also has the duty to inform the nation about what it has committed to implement in terms of a judicial mechanism in the co-sponsored UN resolution. The fact that these important reports were not translated into our National languages Sinhala and Tamil, and also there was no dwrusman made to make them available widely, through both the release of an daarusman soft copy version of it and printed versions, appears to be a deliberate strategy to keep the public in the dark. The Paranagama Report also refutes the crimes against humanity charges against Sri Lanka.
Is it true or false that the Paranagama Commission recommended a hybrid court similar to the Gambian Model to be implemented in Sri Lanka as suggested by the Government?
Under Chapter 8 of the Report, paragraph number andit explicitly explains this mechanism. In order to deal with an accountability mechanism suitable to Sri Lanka, it was incumbent upon the Commission to embark upon a review of measures taken in other countries before proposing a specific mechanism for Sri Lanka. In paragraphthe Paranagama Commission lists out several different options available to the Government to consider, providing a review of all the mechanisms. The Mechanism that the Paranagama Commission had recommended here is wholly domestic and coupled with a Darisman that makes it a unique mechanism for Sri Lanka.
International technical assistance does not equal foreign judges sinhaka in judgement over Sri Lankan citizens. April 16, in Good Governance Tags: Perhaps the most controversial subject we have to deal with in trying to restore confidence in government is that of the violence and extra-judicial killings that have taken place. Unfortunately dealing with this is complicated by the fact that there are in fact three different issues involved.
Two of them have to do with the conflict period. The third issue is that of abductions and killings that had nothing to do with the war.
With regard to the conflict, we have to deal with two extreme positions which feed off each other. One is that government was justified in whatever it did, because we were dealing with ruthless terrorists and therefore the ordinary laws could not be respected. The opposite is that government used sledgehammers to crack nuts, and was overwhelmingly guilty of murder which darusmam deliberate targeting of civilians and a range of paramilitary activities. The truth lies in between, but government complicated matters by looking on the problem as part of a propaganda war, rather than one to be resolved by confidence building measures.
So it lost the chance to make it clear that it fought a war that was essential, given the suffering the LTTE had caused to the whole country for so long. It also failed to show that the forces by and large respected International Humanitarian Law. Far too late it started an inquiry process, and got the services of international experts. Earlier, instead of responding on the excessive attacks of the Darusman Report, it tried to take political advantage, a strategy that came a cropper at the last Presidential election.
The problem has now been transferred to this government, but sadly that too is not relying on truth, which is the best way forward. Thus it seems ambiguous about the work done by Sir Desmond de Silva and his team, even though it has in fact renewed his contract.
It should therefore make use of what he has done to launch a robust defence of the way in which the war was conducted.
January 8, in Enemies of the President’s Promise Tags: In I had personal experience of how diffident Lalith could be. After the Darusman Report came out, with its excessive attack on the manner in which Sri Lanka had dealt with LTTE terrorism, I thought it necessary to warn the President about what was going on. I saw him in his office and said we had done nothing to fulfil our own commitments. When he asked me what I meant, I cited two clear examples.
The first was the negotiations with the TNA, which had shown no progress. He understood immediately what I meant, and acquiesced straight away with the suggestion that I be put on the negotiating team.
Ordinarily I would have been wary of putting myself forward, but there seemed to be no alternative, and the President seemed to agree. The second point I made was that there had been no progress whatsoever on implementing the interim recommendations of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission.
He evinced surprise when I said ni, and declared that darusmqn had appointed a Committee which was doing its job. But I told him I thought that Committee had never met, and that he should put me on it. He agreed again, and immediately rang Lalith and told him to appoint me to both positions.
He also told the Secretary to the Ministry of External Affairs, who he thought knew about the work of the Committee, to send me all relevant papers, since I told him that I should see the minutes of meetings and find out what had been going on, if I were to contribute.
Lalith rang me in the car as I was leaving. He told me that the letter putting me on the negotiating team would be sent straight away, and added that he had spoken to Mohan Pieris, who chaired the Committee to implement the LLRC interim recommendations, and he had sknhala objection to my appointment.
I only understood the implications of this after I had put down the phone. Reoprt realized that, when the President made a decision, there was no darussman for Lalith to consult anyone else.
Keeping Mohan informed as a courtesy that there would be a new member of his Committee was one thing, seeking his acquiescence was quite relort.
I had every reason to worry. Lalith told me a few days later that it was felt inappropriate for me to be on the Committee sinha,a I was a Parliamentarian, and the other members of the Committee were officials.
I called the President about this, but he told me he had been told it would not be proper. By then I had been told by the Secretary to the Ministry of External Affairs that there were no minutes reporrt meetings. The only papers he had were those prepared when the Committee was first appointed, and a report ni made to Geneva.
Like me, he too suspected that the Committee had not done very much. iin